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ABSTRACT 
 
Orbital debris poses a significant threat to spacecraft health and safety.  Recent events such as China’s anti-
satellite test and the Breeze-M rocket explosion have led to an even greater awareness and concern in the 
satellite community.  Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 
established requirements that routine conjunction assessment screening shall be performed for all 
maneuverable spacecraft having perigees less than 2000 km or within 200 km of geosynchronous altitude.  
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has developed an operational collision risk assessment 
process to protect NASA’s high-value unmanned (robotic) assets that has been in use since January 2005.  
This paper provides an overview of the NASA robotic conjunction assessment process, including 
descriptions of the new tools developed to analyze close approach data and of the risk mitigation strategies 
employed.  In addition, statistical data describing the number of conjunctions experienced are presented.  A 
debris avoidance maneuver performed by Aura in June of 2008 is described in detail to illustrate the 
process 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Orbital debris poses a significant threat 
to spacecraft health and safety.  The 
current number of catalogued objects is 
greater than 13,000, with the number of 
objects increasing by several hundred 
per year (Ref 1).  Most of these tracked 
objects are characterized as orbital 
debris.  Satellites routinely collide with 
small particles that cause little or no 
damage.  However, if a large particle 
were to hit an operational satellite, the 
impact could result in the end of the 
mission.  A large part of the orbital 
debris population resides in low earth 
orbit (LEO), where the density 
distribution of cataloged objects is 
concentrated near mean equatorial 
altitudes of 700 – 1100 km, and in 
Geosynchronous (GEO) orbit.  Recent 
events such as China’s anti-satellite 
(ASAT) test and the Breeze-M rocket 
explosion highlight the importance of 
having a robust operations concept that 
includes monitoring, analyzing, and 
mitigating collision risks. 
 
NASA has long required Conjunction 
Assessment (CA) for its manned assets.  
That process is implemented and 
operated by the NASA Johnson Space 
Center (JSC).  However, CA was not 
being performed for the unmanned 
(robotic) on-orbit missions.  In 2004, in 
response to the growing debris risk, 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) developed and implemented a 
process for providing routine CA 
operations to protect the Morning and 
Afternoon Earth Science Constellations 
(ESCs) (Ref 2).  These high-value assets 
reside in sun-synchronous frozen orbits 
with a 705 km mean equatorial altitude.  
Their mean local solar crossing times are 
established in a relationship that allows 
the missions to share their datasets and 
cross-calibrate their instruments.  The 
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missions are managed independently by 
several different NASA centers as well 
as the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales 
(CNES) and the Comision Nacional de 
Actividades Espaciales (CONAE), but 
the mission operators work together to 
ensure the health and safety of the 
constellations.  NASA JSC provided 
assistance in establishing the robotic 
process, which needed to be somewhat 
different from the manned process due to 
the different orbit regimes and different 
operations processes. 
 
In August of 2007, because of the 
increasing threat posed by orbiting 
debris, NASA established a policy 
(NASA Procedural Requirement 
8715.6A) that requires routine CA 
operations for robotic assets that have 
maneuvering capability and that have 
perigees lower than 2000 km or pass 
within 200 km of geosynchronous 
altitude (Ref 3).  Since the signing of the 
policy, the need arose for a robust 
automated system that could easily 
provide support to missions in many 
orbit regimes.  Under management of the 
Space Systems Protection Mission 
Support Office (Code 590.1), the GSFC 
CA process is now available to all 
NASA unmanned (robotic) missions.  
The process is currently being used to 
support 24 spacecraft in a variety of 
orbit regimes.  In addition to the ESC 
missions, these include the Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite System 
constellation, the Gamma Ray Large 
Area Space Telescope (GLAST), the 
Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission 
(TRMM), JASON, and the Ocean 
Surface Topography Mission 
(OSTM)/JASON-2.  This paper 
describes the NASA Robotic 
Conjunction Assessment Process and its 
application to customer assets. 
 
PROCESS OVERVIEW 
 
The NASA Robotic Conjunction 
Assessment process consists of 3 steps:  
 
1. Generating close approach 
predictions between customer 
assets and other objects in the 
United States Strategic 
Command’s 
(USSTRATCOM) Space 
Object Catalog 
2. Assessing the collision risk 
posed by predicted close 
approach events 
3. Working with mission 
Owner/Operators to plan any 
necessary risk-mitigating 
action 
 
The details for each step are described in 
this section. 
 
Step 1:  Event Prediction Screening 
 
The first step is to predict the close 
approach events.  USSTRATCOM is 
chartered with tracking objects in orbit 
around the Earth.  Each tracked object is 
assigned a unique identification number 
and documented in the High Accuracy 
space object Catalog (HAC).  
USSTRATCOM can provide a service 
whereby they screen Owner/Operator 
ephemerides against the Catalog and 
provide predicted miss distance data.  In 
order to obtain that information, NASA 
entered into an agreement with the 
Department of Defense under which 
USSTRATCOM provides support to the 
GSFC Space Systems Protection 
Mission Support Office CA Team by 
performing routine screenings for 
customer missions against the HAC (Ref 
4).  Per this agreement as well as 
Reference 5, a dedicated Orbital Safety 
Analyst (OSA) provides conjunction 
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assessment data for NASA customers.  
The OSA computes separation distances 
between each of the catalogued objects 
and the customer ephemerides provided 
by the mission Owner/Operator.  The 
nominal prediction frequency is once a 
day Monday through Friday, with 
screenings against the full HAC on 
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and 
supplemental screenings for interesting 
events on Tuesday and Thursday.  
Predictions are made 7 days into the 
future for low-earth orbiting (LEO) 
assets and 10 days into the future for 
geosynchronous (GEO) assets.  Any 
planned maneuvers are modeled in the 
ephemerides provided by the mission. 
Three different mission safety volumes 
are used in the screening process to 
identify predicted conjunction events.  
These volumes are defined centered on 
the asset.  If a secondary object is 
predicted to intersect the safety volume, 
the volume is violated and a specified 
action is taken.  The safety volumes 
dictate different data product deliveries 
as well as actions taken by the CA 
Team.  Table 1 lists the dimensions of 
the safety volumes that have been 
defined for the NASA robotic CA 
process.  The coordinate frame for all 
volumes is the radial, in-track, cross-
track (RIC) coordinate frame. 
 
Table 1:  Safety Volume Definitions 
 LEO Safety Volumes 
GEO Safety 
Volumes 
Data Product 
 
Radial 
(km) 
In-Track 
(km) 
Cross-
Track (km) 
Stand-off 
Radius 
(km) 
 
Monitor 
Volume 
(ellipsoid) 
±2 ±25 ±25 40 
Conjunction 
Assessment 
Screening 
Summary 
Tasking/Alert 
Volume 
(box) 
±0.5 ±5 ±5 15 
Orbital 
Conjunction 
Message 
Watch 
Volume 
(sphere) 
1 km stand-off radius 2 
Vector 
Covariance 
Message 
 
The Monitor Volume is the largest safety 
volume and serves as the initial reporting 
filter.  For each asset, all objects that are 
predicted to violate the Monitor Volume 
are reported to the GSFC CA Team via 
the Conjunction Assessment Screening 
Summary.  This product is provided 
each time the catalog screening is 
performed and includes the catalog 
identification number of the secondary 
object and the RIC miss distance 
components at the time of closest 
approach.  The Tasking Volume is a 
smaller volume, and close approach 
predictions that fall within this volume 
require further analysis.  The OSA will 
examine the orbit determination solution 
for both objects and request additional 
tracking on the secondary object if 
necessary so that a more accurate orbit 
can be determined.  For each Tasking 
Volume violation, state vector and state 
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vector uncertainty information at the 
time of closest approach is provided to 
the GSFC CA Team in the form of an 
Orbital Conjunction Message (OCM).  
This information allows for the collision 
probability to be calculated.  Additional 
orbit determination details such as the 
fit-span, number of observations, and 
solve-for parameters at the time of 
closest approach are also included in the 
OCM.  For all watch volume violations, 
the OSA provides a Vector Covariance 
Message (VCM) for each object.  The 
VCM contains state and covariance 
information at the epoch of the orbit 
determination solution, allowing the 
state to be propagated by the GSFC CA 
Team for further analysis. 
 
Step 2:  Risk Analysis 
 
The second step is the processing of the 
screening data.  The GSFC CA Team 
has developed and implemented a set of 
tools called the Collision Assessment 
System (CAS) which is used to generate 
reports and perform event evaluation.  
The CAS consists of the following 
modules: 
• Secure File Transfer Protocol 
(SFTP) 
• Parser/Monitor Scripts 
• Secure Access Database  
• Collision Assessment and 
Mitigation (CAM) Tool 
Suite: 
1.  Conjunction Visualization 
Script 
2.  2-D Collision Probability 
Utility 
3.  Monte Carlo Collision 
Simulation 
4.  Nonlinear Collision 
Probability Tool 
5.  Time History Trending Tool 
6.  Collision Avoidance 
Planning Module 
• Secure Webpage (Portal) 
• Configuration Management 
System  
 
The portion of the CAS that provides the 
set of tools used to analyze close 
approach events is known as the 
Collision Assessment and Mitigation 
(CAM) tool suite.  The CAM tool suite 
is built using the Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) software products 
FreeFlyer
® 
(FF) and Matlab
®
.  The tool 
suite interfaces to the Secure Access 
Database for data input and output.  
Some of the tools are run autonomously 
as part of the routine daily CA 
processing; all may be run manually to 
further assess the risk posed by a 
conjunction event.  Further details 
concerning the architecture and 
operation of the CAS may be found in 
References 6 and 7.  
 
Each time data is received from the 
OSA, the GSFC CA team is responsible 
for processing the data and providing 
risk assessment analysis results to the 
mission stakeholders.  Parser/Monitor 
scripts run constantly looking for new 
data.  Once a delivery is detected, the 
data is placed into the CA Database and 
the CAS begins analyzing the data, an 
automated process through which a 
Conjunction Summary Report is 
automatically generated and distributed 
via e-mail to mission stakeholders.  Each 
mission receives a customized 
Conjunction Summary Report which 
may contain data for multiple assets.  
The report echoes the screening results 
(miss distances and time of closest 
approach) computed by the OSA for the 
Owner/Operator ephemeris and the 
JSpOC solution.  It also contains values 
computed by the CAS, including 
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Probability of Collision (Pc) and clock 
angle.  Event trends are plotted for the 
miss distance components, total miss 
distance, Pc, and clock angle.  The report 
also lists any expected upcoming 
spacecraft maneuvers.  In order to help 
analysts keep track of activities 
involving all spacecraft in a 
constellation, planned maneuvers and 
close approach predictions are listed on a 
‘CA Calendar’ included in the report.  
The CA Calendar contains the 
following: 
• Close approach predictions that 
are less than 1 km 
• Close approach events that have 
Pc values greater than 1e-7 
• Planned maneuver dates and start 
times 
Mission stakeholders usually receive the 
Conjunction Summary Report less than 
an hour after the screening data is 
received by the CAS.   
 
The second activity that the automated 
software performs is to analyze each 
OCM that was received and create an 
analysis package called the OCM 
Analysis Report.  These reports are 
produced for each Tasking Volume 
event and posted to the CA Portal 
webpage.  The OCMs are first ingested 
into the database, then each OCM is 
automatically processed through the 2-D 
Collision Probability Utility and the 
Monte Carlo Collision Simulation Tool.  
This processing produces a consolidated 
OCM Analysis Report package 
containing a series of plots and text 
reports which is posted to the Portal 
webpage for review by the analyst.  The 
output from the 2-D Collision 
Probability Utility consists of the miss 
distance, various collision probability 
calculations, conjunction geometry 
information, and collision probability 
sensitivity analysis.  The numerical 
results from the two different Pc 
computation utilities are placed back 
into the CAS database.  This analysis 
occurs overnight for routine operations, 
since the data is received at the close of 
business.  These reports are made 
available to the mission Owner/Operator 
upon request for high interest events, but 
are mainly used by the CA Team to 
analyze the event to determine the 
associated threat.   
 
In the morning, the CA Team analyzes 
each OCM Analysis Report as well as 
accompanying data in the Screening 
Summary file to identify which close 
approach events pose a potential threat 
and thus warrant further analysis.  In 
particular, the total miss distance and the 
R-I-C components as well as the 
probability of collision are considered.  
If after this inspection the item is still 
considered a potential threat, the analyst 
refers first to the orbit determination data 
located in the OCM.  The length of the 
orbit solution fit, the number of tracks 
and observations available, as well as the 
number of observations used in the orbit 
solution are reviewed.  The number and 
location of the stations that are tracking 
the secondary object are considered.  
With this information, the analyst then 
determines if it is necessary to contact 
the OSA and discuss potential changes 
to the tracking and orbit solutions.  If all 
of the tracking observations for the 
secondary object are found to be from a 
point in the orbit not near the 
conjunction or if the object has not been 
tracked recently, a request is made of the 
OSA to try to obtain additional tracking 
data for the object.  Requesting 
increased tasking does not guarantee that 
additional data will be received.   
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Based on their evaluation of the data, the 
CA Team produces a “watchlist” 
detailing the response being taken for 
each event.  Events are either classified 
as “not a threat”, “monitor”, or “threat”.  
If the event is “not a threat”, no further 
action is taken by the team.  Items may 
be classified as “not a threat” because 
the conjunction geometry is such that the 
two items will not cross paths despite 
being close to each other, for instance.  
Items labeled as “monitor” are those 
which may not have credible orbit 
determination solutions.  Time will be 
spent attempting to gather more data and 
further evaluate the event.  As additional 
data is received, the CA Team continues 
to review the standard reports, but also 
begins to perform close approach event 
trending by ‘linking’ several solutions 
together in order to establish future 
trends.  The Time History Trending Tool 
allows the engineer to plot time histories 
of parameters obtained from a series of 
OCMs.  Data such as the miss distance, 
orbital elements, uncertainties, force 
model parameters, event time, and 
conjunction geometry can be trended 
and examined for consistency.  The 
solution consistency is examined using 
RIC corrections at the time of closest 
approach (TCA) for both the primary 
and the secondary object (3σ check) and 
a projected covariance plot in the 
conjunction plane.  It is expected that as 
the time to closest approach shortens, the 
covariance on well-tracked objects 
should decrease.  Also, it is expected 
that successive updates to the orbit 
determination solutions, and hence 
updates to the miss distance, should be 
consistent with the uncertainty 
represented by the covariance matrix.  
The CA Team prefers to see three 
consecutive consistent solutions in order 
to recommend a course of action based 
on the data. 
 
Another criterion is that the Pc must be 
high and predicted to stay high.  Several 
tools are used to predict the behavior of 
the Pc, such as how the collision 
probability value will evolve as the 
position uncertainty changes, which is 
called “Pc forecasting”.  If the Pc is high 
and the orbital uncertainties in the 
secondary object are large, chances are 
the Pc will drop as the time to TCA gets 
shorter.  Sometimes the secondary object 
is not well tracked.  In these cases, the 
probability metric may be 
mathematically “high” due to the large 
uncertainty, but the true risk is difficult 
or impossible to quantify.  Within the 2-
D Collision Probability Utility, the value 
for Pc is plotted for various scale factors 
applied to the covariance.  Scale factors 
less than 1 represent a contraction of the 
covariance, which is expected as time to 
TCA decreases.  If the Pc is forecasted to 
go down with increased orbit 
determination accuracy, the event may 
not be a threat.  If the Pc is forecasted to 
go up or stay static, the event may be a 
threat.   
 
Finally, the conjunction geometry is 
examined.  The Conjunction 
Visualization Script allows the CA 
Engineer to investigate the 3-
dimensional geometry of the encounter.  
In addition to providing time histories of 
the assets’ orbital elements, the relative 
orbital geometry and 2-D and 3-D orbit 
visualizations are available.  The 
Visualization Script is used to analyze 
the respective orbits of both objects.  
Time history orbital element information 
is generated and used to examine how 
the close approach event evolves over 
time; the close approach geometry is 
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visually represented.  The angle between 
the primary axis of the combined 
covariance in the conjunction plane, 
which is a two-dimensional surface that 
is perpendicular to the relative velocity 
vector, and the miss vector is also 
determined and is called the “clock 
angle”.  Investigation of this “clock 
angle” gives insight into how changes in 
the conjunction geometry will affect the 
Pc.  For clock angles near zero, the Pc is 
maximized for a given miss distance and 
a given covariance.  Changes in 
conjunction geometry that drive the 
angle away from zero can be expected to 
decrease the Pc.  There have also been 
cases where the miss distance is so small 
that any rotation of the combined 
covariance in the conjunction plane will 
not lead to any significant reduction in 
the Pc.  In these cases, the conjunction 
plane plot tells you that future changes 
in the orbit determination solutions will 
not significantly alter the Pc.   
 
Items considered to be a “threat” are 
those for which avoidance maneuver 
planning will likely be initiated as the 
TCA nears.  Events for which maneuver 
planning is initiated are called “High 
Interest Events” (HIE).  The support 
process for items classified as “threat” or 
HIE involves intensified conjunction 
screening and additional analysis prior to 
and following the event until either the 
threat goes away or a mitigation plan is 
executed.  For high interest events, the 
GSFC CA Team produces a CA 
Summary Package (Power Point 
presentation package) that includes event 
trends, probability sensitivity analysis, 
and post-maneuver close approach 
predictions.  The package is updated 
each time new data is received, and 
meetings are held with the 
Owner/Operator to discuss these 
updates.  Recommendations made to the 
project are also included.  If a Risk 
Mitigation Maneuver (RMM) is 
executed, a memo is also prepared and 
provided to the mission stakeholders to 
officially document the event.  The 
memo is similar in content to the Power 
Point package. 
 
 
Step 3:  Mitigation Planning 
 
Step 3 of the process is risk mitigation 
planning.  When an event is considered 
to be a “threat”, the Owner/Operator is 
notified by the CA Team, and the two 
groups work together to decide what 
approach will be taken to investigate 
possible mitigation options.  Typically, 
the CA Team provides a “first guess” of 
the type, size, and timing for a maneuver 
that would mitigate the risk.  In general, 
the CA Team usually chooses an 
opportunity during a day shift roughly 
24 hours prior to the TCA. This allows 
enough time to gather as much 
information as possible about the 
conjuncting object while also allowing 
time following the maneuver for along-
track differences to accumulate to 
mitigate the conjunction.  Maneuver 
strategies, however, are ultimately 
dependent on individual mission orbit 
requirements and propulsion capability.  
The Flight Operations Team therefore 
provides input on mission constraints.  
These include limitations in the direction 
of the burn, the time of day the team 
likes to perform maneuvers based on 
operations procedures and constraints, 
and limits on the size of the burn 
necessary to maintain orbit 
requirements.  Another factor that would 
contribute to the selection of a maneuver 
time is the availability of 
communications passes.  Often the team 
attempts to schedule the maneuver 
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during an already-scheduled pass to 
minimize the need for requesting 
additional services.  Maneuver planning 
begins several days prior to the TCA, 
with daily checks to see whether to 
continue the planning or if the threat has 
mitigated itself.  Assuming the threat is 
detected 5-7 days prior to the TCA, this 
process allows sufficient time to work 
the issue.  Obviously, the maneuver 
planning process can be very 
complicated for a mission having many 
constraints.  For instance, the Terra, 
Aqua, and Aura missions in the ESC are 
restricted to only performing orbit-
raising maneuvers, not orbit-lowering 
ones.  They also have tight ground track 
control requirements that limit the 
amount that the orbit can be raised, 
depending on where the spacecraft is 
located within the control box at the 
time.  Since planning time is usually 
limited, serially investigating multiple 
maneuver options and then rejecting 
them becomes a problem.  The CA Team 
has developed a tool which allows the 
available trade space to be analyzed in 
advance, so that only one or two options 
need be considered (Ref 8).  Sample 
output from the tool and a description of 
how it can be used to enable maneuver 
choice is described in the Aura case 
study below.   
 
Once the maneuver option is chosen and 
the details are planned, an ephemeris is 
created and sent to the OSA for 
screening to make sure that no new 
conjunctions have been created by 
maneuvering.  As updates continue to be 
received on the orbit determination 
solution for the conjuncting object, the 
plan is revisited at least daily to update 
the maneuver size, although the timing 
usually remains fixed due to comm. 
constraints.  These updates will also be 
screened by the OSA.  If the event is 
deemed no longer a threat, the maneuver 
planning is ended and no maneuver is 
executed.  If the threat remains at a point 
in time when a final decision is required 
based on the operations concept for the 
spacecraft, the maneuver is executed. 
 
The following example illustrates the 
process for the Aura versus 1399 event 
in June 2008. 
 
Step 3:  Operational GSFC CA Process Case 
Study - Aura Versus 1399 
 
On Saturday the 21
st
 of June, 2008, the 
routine daily screening report identified 
a close approach between Aura and 
debris object 1399 (TRIAD 1 debris).  
The TCA was reported to be at 15:34 Z 
on the 27
th
 of June.  The first reported 
miss distance on Monday was 
approximately 29.8 m with a high 
collision probability of 7.91e-2.  The CA 
Team evaluated the event over several 
days of increased tasking. While 
monitoring the event, the miss distance 
remained small and the Pc remained 
high.  These consistent solutions, 
coupled with the fact that the conjunctor 
was a well-tracked object receiving 
several new tracks each day from two 
different stations, led to high confidence 
in the predictions.  The Aura Flight 
Project was notified and avoidance 
maneuver planning was initiated on 
Monday afternoon.   
 
Available maneuver planning options 
were limited due to the ground track 
control requirements.  Aura had recently 
performed a nominal drag make-up 
(DMU) maneuver, placing the spacecraft 
near the top of its control box.  Any 
maneuver longer than two seconds in 
duration (roughly 0.01 m/s in maneuver 
magnitude) would violate the orbit 
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requirements, an option only to be 
undertaken as a very last resort.  
Fortunately, a maneuver of this size 
would mitigate the conjunction.  
However, there was significant concern 
about potential maneuver modeling 
inaccuracy, since Aura had never 
performed such a small maneuver.  
Since the orbit determination solution 
was so consistent and predictable, the 
CA Team recommended planning the 
maneuver for 48 hours prior to the TCA 
to allow sufficient time for along-track 
differences to accumulate and mitigate 
the conjunction regardless of large 
maneuver performance uncertainty.  The 
Owner/Operator chose instead to 
perform the maneuver at TCA-24 hours 
hoping that the conjunction uncertainty 
would decrease, causing the Pc to also 
decrease with constant miss distance 
predictions.   
 
Figure 1 shows the maneuver trade space 
available for the Aura versus 1399 event.  
This tool is used to show the trade off 
between maneuver magnitude and phase 
time (the time between the maneuver 
execution and the TCA) and the effects 
on the post-maneuver miss distance.  
The tool assumes that posigrade 
maneuvers linearly increase the along-
track uncertainty, as documented in Ref 
8.  The contour lines represent lines of 
constant post-maneuver miss distance at 
TCA.  The burn size (delta-v) and 
phasing time can be located on the plot 
to find combinations which result in a 
miss distance that sufficiently mitigates 
the risk.  For this event, the post-
maneuver miss distance needed was at 
least 500 meters.  Because the Aura 
mission also has a ground track control 
requirement, the green curve (read on 
the right hand vertical axis) shows the 
ground track error as a function of burn 
duration.  The horizontal, dashed green 
lines indicate the limits of the Aura 
WRS-2 ground track control box of 18 ± 
10 km.  This tool aids in maneuver 
planning that not only mitigates risk 
imposed by the conjunction, but also 
satisfies operational constraints.  The red 
dotted vertical line indicates the chosen 
burn duration, which is slightly less than 
the maximum allowed by the ground 
track control requirement.  The star 
indicates the chosen burn duration and 
phasing time.  The star shows that a burn 
duration of about 0.009 m/s executed 
about 24 hours prior to TCA will result 
in a predicted post-maneuver miss 
distance of about 650m.  Figure 1 also 
shows that this maneuver combination 
will not violate the ground track control 
requirement and results in a WRS-2 
turnaround of 11km, well above the 8km 
requirement. 
 
Concurrent with risk mitigation 
maneuver planning, the GSFC CA team 
continued to monitor the evolution of the 
conjunction.  Additional orbit solutions 
were requested from the OSA, and in all 
10 solutions were received by 
Wednesday, June 25.  The miss distance 
remained low and the probability of 
collision remained high, as the orbit 
determination solutions for the 
conjuncting object were consistent.  The 
Wednesday afternoon solution reported 
the lowest miss distance of 13 m and the 
highest collision probability of 4.7e-1 
during the evolution of the conjunction 
event.  As expected by the CA Team, the 
conjunction uncertainty did not 
unexpectedly decrease, and the 
maneuver was performed on Thursday 
morning. 
 
Figures 2 shows the evolution of the 
miss distance of the close approach 
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event throughout the week.  The values 
shown in the graphs were computed at 
the TCA.  The miss distance increased 
by 150 m between the first and second 
solutions, then began a steady trend 
downward which continued throughout 
the event, reaching a minimum value of 
13 m prior to the execution of the risk 
mitigation maneuver on the morning of 
Thursday, June 26.  The data points in 
these plots represent discrete solutions. 
 
Figure 3 shows the Pc time history trend.  
The graph shows that the probability 
remained extremely high throughout the 
event.  Typically, if the miss distance 
predictions remain constant, the Pc will 
drop as the propagation time and the 
position uncertainties decrease.  
However, since the miss distance 
decreased as the event evolved, the Pc 
value remained high.   
 
The final solution in Figures 2 and 3 is a 
post-maneuver definitive solution.  This 
definitive solution is generated by 
collecting sufficient post-maneuver data 
and anchoring the OD epoch at TCA.  
The post-maneuver definitive miss 
distance was 795m, compared to the 
prediction of 819m.  Both the predicted 
and definitive post-maneuver Pc values 
were zero. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Aura vs. 1399 Maneuver Planning Trade Space (Ref 9) 
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Figure 2:  Aura Versus 1399 Miss Distance History (Ref 9) 
 
 
Figure 3:  Aura Versus 1399 Collision Probability History (Ref 9) 
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STATISTICS AND OPERATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES  
 
This Conjunction Assessment risk 
evaluation process has been used in 
routine spacecraft operations at GSFC 
since January 2005.  In addition to 
analyzing and assessing each 
conjunction event, the GSFC CA Team 
has been monitoring statistics reflecting 
the debris environment experienced by 
its customer’s assets, especially the ESC 
missions.  The database into which the 
OCM data is placed can be mined to 
discern trends in debris quantity, repeat 
conjunctions with the same debris, and 
other meaningful statistics that help the 
Team to refine and augment the process.  
Figure 3 shows the number of unique 
safety volume violations experienced by 
the ESC missions each month since 
screening began.   The Figure shows that 
the constellation as a whole experiences 
about 750 Monitor Volume violations 
per month, which corresponds to about 
15 per week per spacecraft.  Assets 
average about 1 conjunction per week 
within the Tasking Volume, and about 3 
High Interest Events per year. 
 
As a result of implementing the process, 
there have been 7 times when a 
spacecraft has maneuvered to mitigate 
the risk posed by a conjunction event.  
Table 2 lists the spacecraft involved in 
these events, in addition to the minimum 
total miss distance and corresponding Pc 
for that event.  In addition to events 
which resulted in avoidance maneuvers, 
there were also four instances in which a 
planned orbit maintenance maneuver 
was waived off to avoid worsening the 
effects of a conjunction predicted shortly 
after the maneuver time. 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  ESC Monthly Safety Volume Violations 
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Table 2:  Risk Mitigation Maneuvers Performed by the ESC 
Asset Secondary Maneuver Date Minimum Total 
Miss (m) 
Pc 
Terra 14222 
(SCOUT G-1) 
21-Oct, 2005 37 6.82E-2 
PARASOL 81257 
(Analyst SAT) 
16-Jan, 2007 43 1.51E-3 
SAC-C 14345 
(SL-8 DEB) 
16-Feb, 2007 57 3.40E-6 
Terra 31410 
(FENGYUN 1C 
DEB) 
22-Jun, 2007 18 1.58E-1 
CloudSat 28893 
(SINAH 1) 
04-Jul, 2007 38 2.24E-2 
Aura 1399 
(TRIAD 1 debris) 
26-Jun, 2008 11 4.80E-1 
CloudSat 8542 
(Delta I Debris) 
20-Jul, 2008 90 1.77E-3 
 
 
IMPACT OF THE CHINESE ANTI-
SATELLITE TEST 
 
On January 11, 2007, the Chinese 
performed a test of an Anti-Satellite 
(ASAT) weapon during which they 
destroyed their Fengyun 1C weather 
satellite. This single event significantly 
impacted the debris environment near 
the ESC altitude, since the orbit of 
Fengyun 1C was 861 km, only 150 km 
above the ESC and in a similar orbit 
plane.  Over 2000 objects have been 
cataloged as a result of this event, when 
the debris environment usually increases 
by only about 200 objects per year (Ref 
10).  The first close approach between an 
ESC asset and a piece of Fengyun 1C 
debris occurred on Feb 4, just a few 
weeks after the event.  Initially, ASAT 
debris made up 10 percent of the 
monthly predicted conjunctions.  That 
average percentage has grown to 13% 
over the last 18 months.  Figure 4 shows 
the monthly percentage of safety volume 
violations attributable to the ASAT 
debris. 
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Figure 4:  Percent of ESC Safety Volume Violations due to ASAT Debris 
 
The GSFC CA Team has performed 
analysis to determine the longevity of 
the ASAT debris cloud.  Refs 11 & 12 
describe the details of that analysis.  Ref 
12 shows that in 20 years 70% of the 
catalogued Fengyun debris still remains, 
and that up to 20% of the debris remains 
on orbit 125 years from now.  Since 
most of the debris is above the LEO 
altitudes used by the NASA robotic 
assets, the risk to those assets will 
continue to increase in the foreseeable 
future.  In response, the GSFC CA Team 
is attempting to streamline its event 
evaluation process to ensure that 
appropriate risk mitigating action can be 
taken in minimum time. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE PLANS  
 
The NASA Robotic Conjunction 
Assessment process has enabled the 
protection of many assets during the past 
four years.  The automated process has 
enabled efficient support of many 
events, yet experience has shown that 
having a knowledgeable person 
experienced in orbit determination on 
the team to evaluate the orbit solutions 
for conjuncting objects is a necessity.  In 
addition, each close approach event 
analyzed was found to be sufficiently 
unique that the approach of 
implementing a fixed decision-making 
criterion such as maneuvering any time 
the Pc is a certain value was not taken.  
In the future, the CA Team plans to 
continue to look for ways to streamline 
the assessment process to be able to 
provide efficient support for multiple 
conjunctions simultaneously in 
anticipation of the growth in the number 
of events predicted to occur.  Future 
work will include adding a probabilistic 
risk assessment component to the 
maneuver planning process. 
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